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Abstract
The formal system of intuitionistic epistemic logic IEL was proposed
by S. Artemov and T. Protopopescu. It provides the formal foundation
for the study of knowledge from an intuitionistic point of view based on
Brouwer-Hayting-Kolmogorov semantics of intuitionism. We construct a
cut-free sequent calculus for IEL and establish that polynomial space is
sufficient for the proof search in it. So, we prove that IEL is PSPACE-
complete.
1 Introduction
Modal logic IEL, the basic Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic, was proposed by
S. Artemov and T. Protopopescu in [1]. It was defined by the following cal-
culus.
Axioms:
• Axioms of propositional intuitionistic logic
• K(F → G)→ (KF → KG) (distribution)
• F → KF (co-reflection)
• ¬K⊥ (consistency)
Rule: F, F → G ⊢ G (Modus Ponens)
Here knowledge modalityK means verified truth, as suggested by T.William-
son in [2]. According to the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics of intu-
itionistic logic, a proposition is true iff it is proved. The co-reflection principle
states that any such proof can be verified.
The intuitionistic meaning of implication provides an effective proof checking
procedure that produces a proof of KF given a proof of F . But the assumption
that its output always contains a proof of F is too restrictive. The procedure
1
may involve some trusted sources which do not necessarily produce explicit
proofs of what they verify1. So the backward implication which is the reflection
principle KF → F used in the classical epistemic logic (see [3]) is wrong in the
intuitionistic setting. In general, a proof of KF is less informative than a proof
of F .
At the same time some instances of the reflection principle are true in IEL.
In particular, it is the consistency principle which is equivalent to K⊥ → ⊥.
The proof of K⊥ contains the same information as the proof of ⊥ because there
is no such proof at all. The more general example is the reflection principle for
negative formulas: K¬F → ¬F . It is provable in IEL (see [1]).
In this paper we develop the proof theory for IEL. Our main contributions
are the cut-free sequent formulation and the complexity bound for this logic. It
is established that polynomial space is sufficient for the proof search, so IEL is
PSPACE-complete.
Our cut-elimination technique is syntactic (see [4]). We formulate a special
cut-free sequent calculus IEL−
G
without structural rules (see Section 3) that is
correct with respect to the natural translation into IEL. It has a specific K-
introduction rule (KI1) that also allows to contract a formula F in the presence
of KF in antecedents. This choice makes it possible to prove the admissibility
of the standard contraction rule as well as the admissibility of all natural IEL-
correct modal rules (Sections 4, 5). The admissibility of the cut-rule is proved
by the usual induction on the cutrank (Section 6). As the result we obtain
the equivalence between IEL−
G
and IEL0
G
. (The latter is the straightforwardly
formulated sequent counterpart for IEL with the cut-rule.) Finally we formulate
a light cut-free variant of IEL−
G
with the contraction rule and with modal rules
Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ F
(KI)
Γ1,K(Γ2)⇒ KF
,
Γ⇒ K⊥
(U)
Γ⇒ F
.
It is equivalent to IEL−
G
.
The proof search for IEL can be reduced to the case of so-called minimal
derivations (Section 7). We implement it as a game of polynomial complexity
and use the characterization AP=PSPACE (see [5]) to prove the upper com-
plexity bound for IEL. The matching lower bound follows from the same bound
for intuitionistic propositional logic [6].
2 Sequent formulation of IEL
The definition of intuitionistic sequents is standard (see [4]). Formulas are build
from propositional variables and ⊥ using ∧, ∨, → and K; ¬F means F → ⊥.
A sequent has the form Γ ⇒ F where F is a formula and Γ is a multiset of
formulas. K(Γ) denotes KF1, . . . ,KFn when Γ = F1, . . . , Fn.
1 For example, it can be some trusted database that stores true facts without proofs or
some zero-knowledge proof.
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Let IEL0
G
be the extension of the intuitionistic propositional sequent calculus
(e.g. the propositional part of G2i from [4] with the cut-rule) by the following
modal rules:
Γ,K⊥ ⇒ F ,
Γ⇒ F
(KI0)
K(Γ)⇒ KF
,
Γ, F,KF ⇒ G
(KC)
Γ, F ⇒ G
.
Comment. IEL0
G
is a straightforwardly formulated sequent counterpart of
IEL. Instead of the K-contraction rule (KC) one can take the equivalent K-
elimination rule:
Γ,KF ⇒ G
(KE)
Γ, F ⇒ G
.
Theorem 2.1 IEL0
G
⊢ Γ⇒ F iff IEL ⊢ ∧Γ→ F .
Proof. Straightforward induction on the derivations.
Our goal is to eliminate the cut-rule. But the cut-elimination result for IEL0
G
will not have the desirable consequences, namely, the subformula property and
termination of the proof search procedure. Below we give a different formulation
without these disadvantages.
3 Cut-free variant IEL−
G
with rules (KI1) and (U)
Axioms:
Γ, A⇒ A, A is a variable or ⊥.
Rules:
Γ, F,G⇒ H
(∧ ⇒)
Γ, F ∧G⇒ H
Γ⇒ F Γ⇒ G
(⇒ ∧)
Γ⇒ F ∧G
Γ, F ⇒ H Γ, G⇒ H
(∨ ⇒)
Γ, F ∨G⇒ H
Γ⇒ Fi
(⇒ ∨)i (i = 1, 2)
Γ⇒ F1 ∨ F2
Γ, F → G⇒ F Γ, G⇒ H
(→⇒)
Γ, F → G⇒ H
Γ, F ⇒ G
(⇒→)
Γ⇒ F → G
Γ,K(∆),∆⇒ F
(KI1)
Γ,K(∆)⇒ KF
Γ⇒ K⊥
(U)
Γ⇒ F
In the rule (KI1) we additionally require that Γ does not contain formulas of
the form KG. (This requirement is unessential, see Corollary 4.2.)
We define the main (occurrences of) formulas for axioms and for all inference
rules except (KI1) as usual — they are the displayed formulas in the conclusions
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(not members of Γ, H). For the rule (KI1) all members ofK(∆) and the formula
KF are main.
Comment. In IEL−
G
we do not add (KE) or (KC), but modify (KI0). In the
presence of weakening (it is admissible, see Lemma 4.1) (KI0) is derivable:
Γ⇒ F
(W )
K(Γ),Γ⇒ F
(KI1)
K(Γ)⇒ KF
.
So one can derive all sequents of the forms F ⇒ F for complex F and F ⇒ KF .
The latter also requires weakening in the case of F = KG:
F ⇒ F
(KI1), F 6= KG,
F ⇒ KF
KG⇒ KG
(W )
KG,G⇒ KG
(KI1)
KG⇒ KKG
.
Comment. (U) is necessary. There is no way to prove the sequent K⊥ ⇒ ⊥
without it.
4 Structural rules are admissible
We prove the admissibility of depth-preserving weakening and depth-preserving
contraction. Our proof follows [4] except the case of the rule (KI1). The
corresponding inductive step in the proof of Lemma 4.5 does not require the
inversion of the rule. Instead of it, some kind of contraction is build in the rule
itself.
We write ⊢n Γ⇒ F for “Γ⇒ F has a IEL
−
G
-proof of depth at most n”.
Lemma 4.1 (Depth-preserving weakening) If ⊢n Γ⇒ F then ⊢n Γ, G⇒
F .
Proof. Induction on n, see [4].
Colorrary 4.2 The extended K-introduction rule
Γ1,K(∆),∆,Γ2 ⇒ F
(KIext)
Γ1,K(∆,Γ2)⇒ KF
is admissible in IEL−
G
and ⊢n Γ1,K(∆),∆,Γ2 ⇒ F implies ⊢n+1 Γ1,K(∆,Γ2)⇒
KF .
Proof. Suppose ⊢n Γ1,K(∆),∆,Γ2 ⇒ F and Γ1 = Γ
′
1,K(Γ
′′
1) where Γ
′
1 does
not contain formulas of the form KG. By Lemma 4.1,
⊢n Γ
′
1,K(Γ
′′
1),K(∆),K(Γ2),Γ
′′
1 ,∆,Γ2 ⇒ F .
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So,
⊢n+1 Γ
′
1,K(Γ
′′
1 ,∆,Γ2)⇒ KF
by (KI1). But Γ
′
1,K(Γ
′′
1 ,∆,Γ2) = Γ1,K(∆,Γ2), so ⊢n+1 Γ1,K(∆,Γ2)⇒ KF .
Colorrary 4.3 All axioms of IEL0
G
are provable in IEL−
G
.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove sequents Γ,⊥ ⇒ F and Γ,K⊥ ⇒ F :
Γ,⊥ ⇒ ⊥
(KIext)
Γ,⊥ ⇒ K⊥
(U)
Γ,⊥ ⇒ F
,
Γ,⊥ ⇒ ⊥
(KIext)
Γ,K⊥⇒ K⊥
(U)
Γ,K⊥ ⇒ F
.
Lemma 4.4 (Inversion lemma [4]) Left rules are invertible in the following
sense:
If ⊢n Γ, A ∧B ⇒ C then ⊢n Γ, A,B ⇒ C.
If ⊢n Γ, A1 ∨ A2 ⇒ C then ⊢n Γ, Ai ⇒ C, i = 1, 2.
If ⊢n Γ, A→ B ⇒ C then ⊢n Γ, B ⇒ C.
Lemma 4.5 (Depth-preserving contraction) If ⊢n Γ, F, F ⇒ G then ⊢n
Γ, F ⇒ G.
Proof. Induction on n. Case n = 1. When the first sequent is an axiom, the
second one is an axiom too.
Case n + 1. When the displayed two occurrences of F in Γ, F, F ⇒ G are
not main for the last rule of the derivation, apply the induction hypothesis to
the premises of the rule and contract F there.
Suppose one of the occurrences is main. Only axioms may have atomic main
formulas, so we treat atomic F as in case n = 1.
When F has one of the forms A∧B, A∨B or A→ B, we use the same proof
as in [4]. It is based on the items of Inversion lemma formulated in Lemma 4.4.
Case F = KA is new. The derivation of Γ, F, F ⇒ G of depth n+1 has the
form
D
Γ′,K(∆),∆⇒ B
(KI1)
Γ′,K(∆)⇒ KB
where Γ, F, F = Γ′,K(∆) and G = KB; the multiset ∆ contains two copies of
A. We have
⊢n Γ
′,K(∆),∆⇒ B. (1)
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Let ( )− means to remove one copy of A from a multiset. We apply the
induction hypothesis to (1) and obtain ⊢n Γ,K(∆
−),∆− ⇒ B. Then, by (KI1),
⊢n+1 Γ,K(∆
−)⇒ KB .
But Γ, F = Γ′,K(∆−), so ⊢n+1 Γ, F ⇒ G.
5 Admissible modal rules
We have already seen that (KI0) is admissible in IEL
−
G
.
Lemma 5.1 (Depth-preserving K-elimination) If ⊢n Γ,KF ⇒ G then
⊢n Γ, F ⇒ G.
Proof. Induction on n. Case n = 1. When the first sequent is an axiom, the
second one is an axiom too.
Case n+ 1. Consider a proof of depth n+ 1 of a sequent Γ,KF ⇒ G. Let
(R) be its last rule. When the displayed occurrence of KF is not main for (R),
apply the induction hypothesis to its premises and then apply (R) to reduced
premises. It will give ⊢n Γ, F ⇒ G.
Suppose the occurrence of KF is main. The derivation has the form
⊢n Γ
′,K(∆),KF,∆, F ⇒ G′
(KI1)
⊢n+1 Γ
′,K(∆, F )⇒ KG′
.
Apply the induction hypothesis to the premise and remove one copy of F . By
Lemma 4.5 , ⊢n Γ
′,K(∆),∆, F ⇒ G′. Then apply an instance of (KIext) with
Γ1 = Γ
′, F and empty Γ2. By Corollary 4.2 , ⊢n+1 Γ
′,K(∆), F ⇒ KG′.
Colorrary 5.2 (Depth-preserving K-contraction) If ⊢n Γ,KF, F ⇒ G
then ⊢n Γ, F ⇒ G.
Proof. Apply (KE) and contraction. Both rules are admissible and preserve
the depth (Lemmas 5.1, 4.5).
6 Cut is admissible
Consider an IEL−
G
-derivation with additional cut-rule
Γ1 ⇒ F Γ2, F ⇒ G
(Cut)
Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ G
. (2)
6
and some instance of (Cut) in it. The level of the cut is the sum of the depths
of its premises. The rank of the cut is the length of F .
Lemma 6.1 Suppose the premises of (Cut) are provable in IEL−
G
without (Cut).
Then the conclusion is also provable in IEL−
G
without (Cut).
Proof. We define the following well-ordering on pairs of natural numbers:
(k1, l1) > (k2, l2) iff k1 > k2 or k1 = k2 and l1 > l2 simultaneously. By induction
on this order we prove that a single cut of rank k and level l can be eliminated.
As in [4], we consider three possibilities:
I. One of the premises is an axiom. In this case the cut-rule can be eliminated.
If the left premise of (2) is an axiom,
Γ′1, A⇒ A Γ2, A⇒ G
(Cut)
Γ′1, A,Γ2 ⇒ G
,
then (Cut) is unnecessary. The conclusion can be derived from the right premise
by weakening (Lemma 4.1).
Now suppose that the right premise is an axiom. If the cutformula F is not
main for the axiom Γ2, F ⇒ G then the conclusion Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ G is also an axiom,
so (Cut) can be eliminated. If F is main for the right premise then F = G = A
where A is atomic, so (2) has the form
Γ1 ⇒ A Γ2, A⇒ A
(Cut)
Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ A
.
The conclusion can be derived without (Cut) from the left premise by weakening
(Lemma 4.1).
II. Both premises are not axioms and the cutformula is not main for the
last rule in the derivation of at least one of the premises. In this case one can
permute the cut upward and reduce the level of the cut. The cutformula remains
the same, so the cut rule can be eliminated by induction hypothesis (see [4]).
III. The cutformula F is main for the last rules in the derivations of both
premises. In this case we reduce the rank of cut and apply the induction hy-
pothesis.
Note that F is not atomic. (The atomic case is considered in I.) If the last
rule in the derivation of the left premise is (U) then (Cut) can be eliminated:
Γ1 ⇒ K⊥
(U)
Γ1 ⇒ F Γ2, F ⇒ G
(Cut)
Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ G
 
Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ K⊥
(U)
Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ G
.
Case F = KA, the last rule in the derivation of the left premise is (KI1):
Γ,K(∆),∆⇒ A
(KI1)
Γ,K(∆)⇒ KA
D′
Γ′,K(∆′, A),∆′, A⇒ B
(KI1)
Γ′,K(∆′),KA⇒ KB
(Cut)
Γ,K(∆),Γ′,K(∆′)⇒ KB
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From Γ′,K(∆′, A),∆′, A ⇒ B by K-contraction (Corollary 5.2) we obtain
Γ′,K(∆′),∆′, A⇒ B and then reduce the rank:
 
Γ,K(∆),∆⇒ A
D′′
Γ′,K(∆′),∆′, A⇒ B
(Cut)
Γ,K(∆),∆,Γ′,K(∆′),∆′ ⇒ B
(KI1)
Γ,K(∆),Γ′1,K(∆
′)⇒ KB
.
In remaining cases (when F has one of the forms A ∧B, A ∨B or A→ B)
we follow [4].
Theorem 6.2 (Cut) is admissible in IEL−
G
.
Proof. It is a consequence of Lemma 6.1.
Comment. Our formulation of the rule (KI1) combines K-introduction with
contraction. It is done in order to eliminate the contraction rule and to avoid
the case of contraction in the proof of Lemma 6.1. But the contraction rule
remains admissible and can be added as a ground rule too, so we can simplify
the formulation of theK-introduction rule. It results in a “light” cut-free version
IELG:
Axioms: Γ, A⇒ A, A is a variable or ⊥.
Rules:
Γ,∆,∆⇒ G
(C)
Γ,∆⇒ G
Γ, F,G⇒ H
(∧ ⇒)
Γ, F ∧G⇒ H
Γ⇒ F Γ⇒ G
(⇒ ∧)
Γ⇒ F ∧G
Γ, F ⇒ H Γ, G⇒ H
(∨ ⇒)
Γ, F ∨G⇒ H
Γ⇒ Fi
(⇒ ∨)i (i = 1, 2)
Γ⇒ F1 ∨ F2
Γ⇒ F Γ, G⇒ H
(→⇒)
Γ, F → G⇒ H
Γ, F ⇒ G
(⇒→)
Γ⇒ F → G
Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ F
(KI)
Γ1,K(Γ2)⇒ KF
Γ⇒ K⊥
(U)
Γ⇒ F
Lemma 6.3 IELG ⊢ Γ⇒ F iff IEL
−
G
⊢ Γ⇒ F .
Proof. Part “only if”. The rule (KI) is a particular case of (KIext), so all
rules of IELG are admissible in IEL
−
G
(Lemmas 4.5, 4.1 and Corollary 4.2).
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Part “if”. All missing rules are derivable in IELG:
Γ, F → G⇒ F Γ, G⇒ H
(→⇒)
Γ, F → G,F → G⇒ H
(C)
Γ, F → G⇒ H
,
Γ,K(∆),∆⇒ F
(KI)
Γ,K(∆),K(∆)⇒ KF
(C)
Γ1,K(∆)⇒ KF
.
Theorem 6.4 (Cut) is admissible in IELG.
Proof. Lemma 6.1 implies the similar statement for the calculus IELG. Indeed,
one can convert IELG-derivations into IEL
−
G
-derivations, eliminate a single cut
in IEL−
G
, and then convert the cut-free IEL−
G
-derivation backward (Lemma 6.3).
The statement implies the theorem.
Theorem 6.5 The following are equivalent:
1. IEL0
G
⊢ Γ⇒ F.
2. IEL−
G
⊢ Γ⇒ F.
3. IELG ⊢ Γ⇒ F.
4. IEL ⊢ ∧Γ→ F.
Proof. 1.⇔ 2. All rules of IEL0
G
are admissible in IEL−
G
(Lemmas 4.1, 4.5, 5.1,
Theorem 6.2) and vice versa.
The equivalence of 2. and 3. is proved in Lemma 6.3, the equivalence of 1.
and 4. – see Theorem 2.1.
7 Complexity of IEL
We prove that IEL is PSPACE-complete. The lower bound follows from the
same lower bound for the intuitionistic propositional logic. To prove the upper
bound we show that polynomial space is sufficient for the proof search. Our
proof search technique is based on monotone derivations and is similar to one
used in [7].2
Definition 7.1 For a multiset Γ let set(Γ) be the set of all its members. An
instance of a rule
Γ1 ⇒ F1 . . . Γn ⇒ Fn
Γ⇒ F
is monotone if set(Γ) ⊆
⋂
i
set(Γi). A derivation is called monotone if it uses
monotone instances of inference rules only.
2In [7] the definition of a monotone derivation contains a missprint, but actually the correct
Definition 7.1 is used.
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Consider the extension IEL′
G
of the calculus IEL−
G
by the following rules: the
contraction rule (C) and
Γ, F ∧G,F,G⇒ H
(∧C1 ⇒)
Γ, F ∧G,F ⇒ H
,
Γ, F ∧G,F,G⇒ H
(∧C2 ⇒)
Γ, F ∧G,G⇒ H
,
Γ, F ∧G,F,G⇒ H
(∧C ⇒)
Γ, F ∧G⇒ H
,
Γ, F ∨G,F ⇒ H Γ, F ∨G,G⇒ H
(∨C ⇒)
Γ, F ∨G⇒ H
,
Γ, F ⇒ G
(⇒→W )
Γ, F ⇒ F → G
,
Γ, F → G⇒ F Γ, F → G,G⇒ H
(→C⇒)
Γ, F → G⇒ H
,
Γ,K(∆1,∆2),∆1,∆2 ⇒ F
(KIW1 )
Γ,∆1,K(∆1,∆2)⇒ KF
.
In (KIW1 ) we require that the multiset Γ,∆1 does not contain formulas of the
form KG.
Lemma 7.2 IEL′
G
⊢ Γ⇒ F iff IEL−
G
⊢ Γ⇒ F .
Proof. All new rules are some combinations of corresponding ground rules with
structural rules. The latter are admissible in IEL−
G
(Lemmas 4.5, 4.1).
Lemma 7.3 Any derivation in IEL′
G
can be converted into a monotone deriva-
tion of the same sequent.
Proof. Consider a derivation which is not monotone. Chose the first non-
monotone instance (R) of a rule in it. (R) introduces a new formula A in
the antecedent of its conclusion which is not present in antecedents of some
of its premises. Add a copy of A to the antecedent of the conclusion and to
antecedents of all sequents above it. When A has the form KB and is added
to the antecedent of the conclusion of some instance of rules (KI1) or (KI
W
1 )
above (R), add a copy of B to the antecedent of the premise of this rule and to
antecedents of all sequents above it. When B has the form KC, do the same
with C, etc. Finally, insert the contraction rule after (R):
D
(R)
A, Γ⇒ F
 
D′
(R)
A, A, Γ⇒ F
(C)
A, Γ⇒ F
.
The result is also a correct derivation with one non-monotone instance elim-
inated. Repeat the transformation until the derivation becomes monotone.
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Lemma 7.4 A monotone derivation of a sequent Γ ⇒ F in IEL′
G
can be con-
verted into a monotone derivation of the sequent set(Γ)⇒ F that contains only
sequents of the form set(Γ′) ⇒ F ′. The transformation does not increase the
depth of the proof.
Proof. Given a monotone derivation replace all sequents Γ′ ⇒ F ′ in it with
set(Γ′)⇒ F ′. This transformation converts axioms into axioms. We claim that
an instance of an inference rule will be converted either into some other instance
of a rule of IEL′
G
or some premise of the converted instance will coincide with
its conclusion, so the rule can be removed from the resulting proof. The depth
of the proof does not increase.
Indeed, instances of (⇒ ∧), (⇒ ∨) and (U) will be converted into some other
instances of the same rule. An instance of (C) will be converted into the trivial
rule that can be removed:
Γ,∆,∆⇒ G
(C)
Γ,∆⇒ G
 
set(Γ,∆)⇒ G
set(Γ,∆)⇒ G
 remove.
The remaining cases. Let k, l,m, n, k′, l′,m′, n′ ≥ 0 and F k = F, . . . , F︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
.
All monotone instances of (∧ ⇒), (∧C1 ⇒), (∧
C
2 ⇒), (∧
C ⇒) have the form
Γ, (F ∧G)k+1, F l+1, Gm+1 ⇒ H
Γ, (F ∧G)k
′
+1, F l
′
, Gm
′
⇒ H
.
Contractions in antecedents will give
Γ′, F ∧G,F,G⇒ H
(∧C ⇒)
Γ′, F ∧G⇒ H
, l′ = m′ = 0,
Γ′, F ∧G,F,G⇒ H
(∧C1 ⇒)
Γ′, F ∧G,F ⇒ H
, l′ > 0,m′ = 0,
Γ′, F ∧G,F,G⇒ H
(∧C2 ⇒)
Γ′, F ∧G,G⇒ H
, l′ = 0,m′ > 0,
trivial rule (remuved), l′,m′ > 0.
All monotone instances of (∨ ⇒), (∨C ⇒) have the form
Γ, (F ∨G)k+1, F l+1, Gm ⇒ H Γ, (F ∨G)k+1, F l, Gm+1 ⇒ H
Γ, (F ∨G)k
′
+1, F l, Gm ⇒ H
.
Contractions in antecedents will give
Γ′, F ∨G,F ⇒ H Γ, F ∨G,G⇒ H
(∨C ⇒)
Γ′, F ∨G⇒ H
, l = m = 0,
trivial rule (remuved), l > 0 or m > 0.
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All monotone instances of (⇒→), (⇒→W ) have the form
Γ, F k+1 ⇒ G
Γ, F k
′
⇒ F → G
.
Contractions in antecedents will give
Γ′, F ⇒ G
(⇒→W )
Γ′, F ⇒ F → G
, k′ > 0,
Γ′, F ⇒ G
(⇒→)
Γ′ ⇒ F → G
, k′ = 0.
All monotone instances of (→⇒), (→C⇒) have the form
Γ, (F → G)k+1, Gl ⇒ F Γ, (F → G)k
′
+1, Gl+1 ⇒ H
Γ, (F → G)k+1, Gl ⇒ H
.
Contractions in antecedents will give
Γ′, (F → G)⇒ F Γ′, (F → G), G⇒ H
(→C⇒)
Γ′, (F → G)⇒ H
, l = 0,
trivial rule (remuved), l > 0.
All monotone instances of (KI1), (KI
W
1 ) have the form
Γ, Gk+1, (KG)l+1, . . . , Hm+1, (KH)n+1 ⇒ F
Γ, Gk
′
, (KG)l
′
+1, . . . , Hm
′
, (KH)n
′
+1 ⇒ KF
Contractions in antecedents will give
Γ′, G,KG, . . . , H,KH ⇒ F
(KI1)
Γ′,KG, . . . ,KH ⇒ KF
, k′ = 0, . . . ,m′ = 0,
Γ′, G,KG, . . . , H,KH ⇒ F
(KIW1 )
Γ′,KG, . . . , H,KH ⇒ KF
, k′ = 0, . . . ,m′ > 0,
trivial rule (remuved), k′, . . . ,m′ > 0.
Lemma 7.5 (Subformula property) Consider a derivation of a sequent Γ⇒
F in IEL−
G
, IELG or IEL
′
G
. Any sequent in it is composed of subformulas of some
formulas from the multiset Γ, F,K⊥.
Proof. For any rule of these calculi, its premises are composed of subformulas
of formulas occuring in its conclusion and, possibly, of K⊥.
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Definition 7.6 A monotone IEL′
G
-derivation of a sequent set(Γ)⇒ F is called
minimal if it contains only sequents of the form set(Γ′) ⇒ F ′ and has the
minimal depth.
The size of a sequent F1, . . . , Fk ⇒ F is the sum of the lengths of all formulas
Fi and F .
Lemma 7.7 Let Mn be the set of all minimal derivations of sequents of size
n. There exist polynomials p and q such that for any derivation D ∈ Mn, its
depth is bounded by p(n) and the sizes of all sequents in D do not exceed q(n).
Proof. Consider a proof tree for some D ∈ Mn and a path from the root to
some leaf in it:
Γ0 ⇒ F0, . . . ,ΓN ⇒ FN .
All sequents in it are distinct from each other, all of them composed of subfor-
mulas of the first sequent, ⊥ and K⊥ (Lemma 7.5), and Γi ⊆ Γi+1 holds for
i < N .
Divide the path into maximal intervals with the same Γi inside. The length
of such interval is bounded by the number of possible formulas Fi, which is O(n).
The number of intervals is O(n) too, because it does not exceed the maximal
length of a strictly monotone sequence ∆0 ⊂ ∆1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ ∆k of subsets of S
where S is the set of all subformulas of the first sequent extended by ⊥ and
K⊥. So, |S| = O(n) and N = O(n2).
Any sequent Γi ⇒ Fi consists of at most |S|+1 formulas of length O(n), so
its size is O(n2).
Colorrary 7.8 The set of all IEL′
G
-derivable sequents belongs to PSPACE.
Proof. The result follows from the known game characterization AP = PSPACE
([5], see also [8] or [9]).
Let p, q be polynomials from Lemma 7.7. Consider the following two-person
game with players (P ) and (V ). The initial configuration b0 is a sequent of the
form set(Γ) ⇒ F of size n. Player (P ) moves the first. He writes down one or
two sequents of sizes less than q(n) and his opponent (V ) chooses one of them,
and so on. The game is over after p(n) moves of (V ) or when (V ) chooses a
sequent that is an axiom of IEL′
G
.
Let wi and bi denote the moves of players (P ) and (V ) respectively, so
b0, w1, b1, b2, w2, ... is a run of the game. Player (P ) wins if the following
conditions are satisfied:
1. For every move of (P ) the figure
wi
bi−1
is a monotone instance of some
inference rule of IEL′
G
.
2. All sequents written by (P ) have the form set(∆)⇒ G.
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3. At his last move (V ) is forced to choose an axiom of IEL′
G
.
The number and the sizes of moves are bounded by polynomials and the
winning condition is polynomial-time decidable, so the set M of initial configu-
rations that admit a winning strategy for (P ) belongs to PSPACE (see [5]).
By Lemma 7.7, a sequent belongs to M iff it has a minimal derivation. But
it follows from Lemmas 7.3, 7.4, 4.1, that a sequent Γ⇒ F is IEL′
G
-derivable iff
set(Γ) ⇒ F has a minimal derivation. Thus, the general derivability problem
for IEL′
G
belongs to PSPACE too.
Theorem 7.9 The derivability problems for IEL0
G
, IEL−
G
, IELG, IEL
′
G
and IEL
are PSPACE-complete.
Proof. The lower bound PSPACE follows from the same lower bound for in-
tuitionistic propositional logic [6]. The upper bound PSPACE for IEL′
G
is estab-
lished in Corollary 7.8. It can be extended to other calculi by Theorem 6.5 and
Lemma 7.2.
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